

















By Alexey Kushnir, Economics 
Department, Pennsylvania State 
University 
 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series 
Editor: Carlo Carraro 
Matching Markets with Signals 
By Alexey Kushnir, Economics Department, Pennsylvania State University 
 
Summary 
A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in 
decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job 
market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information 
between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some 
matching markets. Specifically, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the 
total number of matches and the welfare of firms, as well as it affects ambiguously the 
welfare of workers. These results run contrary to previous findings that costless signaling 
facilitates match formation. 
 
Keywords: Matching Markets, Signaling 
 
JEL Classification: C70 
 
This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in Maastricht, 
The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN group 

















Address for correspondence: 
 
Alexey Kushnir 
Economics Department  
Pennsylvania State University  
5G Keller Building 
University Park 
PA 16802  
E-mail: aik116@psu.edu Matching Markets with Signals
Alexey Kushnir1
January 20, 2009
1Economics Department, Pennsylvania State University, 5G Keller Building, University Park,
PA 16802, (email: aik116@psu.edu). I am especially gratefull to Vijay Krishna and Marek Pycia for
advising me during this project. This paper bene￿ted from suggestions of Kalyan Chatterjee, Ed
Green, Tymo￿y Mylovanov, and Neil Wallace. I also thank David Ahn, Victor Archavski, Gaurab
Aryal, Yeon-Koo Che, Haluk Ergin, Takashi Kunimoto, Qingmin Liu, Michael Ostrovsky, Moritz
Meyer-ter-Vehn, Lones Smith, and the participants of SED 2008, Stony Brook 2008, and Midwest
2008 conferences for discussions and helpful comments.Abstract
A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decen-
tralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for
new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between ￿rms
and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching mar-
kets. Speci￿cally, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the total number
of matches and the welfare of ￿rms, as well as it a⁄ects ambiguously the welfare of work-
ers. These results run contrary to previous ￿ndings that costless signaling facilitates match
formation.1 Introduction.
Signaling as an actual mechanism design instrument was ￿rst implemented by the Ad Hoc
Committee1 of American Economic Association (AEA) in December 2006 to facilitate match
formation in the job market of new Ph.D. economists. This market begins in the early Fall
each year when economic departments advertise for open faculty positions and graduate stu-
dents nearing completion of their dissertations apply to these positions according to their
preferences. Additionally, each student has an opportunity to send two signals to two de-
partments prior to the market2. Each signal states only that the student has indicated her
interests to some department. Only the faculty of the chosen department knows that the
student has sent her signal. The main part of the market happens afterwards when depart-
ments invite students for interviews and ￿nally choose the best candidates, whom they make
job o⁄ers. However, each department can interview only a small portion of students, which
creates congestion. The decision which candidates to invite for interviews is a strategic one.
An average department does not want to ￿nd itself interviewing the same candidates who
are being interviewed by the elite departments.
The Ad Hoc Committee introduced the signals in order to alleviate the congestion on
the interviewing stage. Signaling is essentially a costless communication, or cheap talk.
There is no penalty attaches for lying, and claims do not directly a⁄ect payo⁄s. Therefore,
the signals can only enlarge the set of equilibria. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that
cheap talk can be credible in an equilibrium if parties have common interests. Moreover,
costless communication leads to new equilibria that are Pareto-superior to the one without
communication. Therefore, one may conjecture that cheap talk should be also bene￿cial
for decentralized matching markets. Roth (2008b) also suggests that the limited number
of signals can credibly transmit information about students￿preference, which could help
to reduce the coordination failures faced by the market participants and facilitate better
match formation (see also "Signaling for Interviews in the Economics Job Market"3 for the
1The Ad Hoc Committee was established in 2005 in order to develop ways to facilitate the market for
new economists. Its members are Alvin E. Roth (chair), John Cawley, Philip Levine, Muriel Niederle, and
John Siegfried.
2This mechanism is implemented via AEA website http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/.
3The document has been created by the Ad Hoc Committee (AEA) to provide advice for participants of
Job Market for new Economists, http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/signaling.pdf.
1discussion). Recently, Coles and Niederle (2007) obtain results that support this intuition4.
They consider one-to-one matching market between ￿rms and workers, whose preferences are
ex-ante uniformly distributed over the range of all possible preference order lists (preferences
are equally likely). Each worker can send only one signal to some ￿rm. They show that the
introduction of signals increases the expected number of matches and the welfare of workers
in equilibria5.
We consider a more realistic assumption (than a uniform distribution) on agents￿pref-
erences and show that signals impede match formation in our environment. Though sig-
nals transmit information about agents￿types truthfully, they also introduce information
asymmetry. The information asymmetry facilitates coordination failures that decrease the
expected number of matches and the welfare of agents. This decrease of agents￿welfare in
new cheap talk equilibria is in the line of Farrell and Gibbons (1989)￿ s results, though it
di⁄ers in its intuition6. Costless communication in their two-agent bargaining model gives
the buyer an opportunity to pretend to have a lower value and the seller an opportunity to
pretend to have a higher value (compare to truthful information transmission in our model).
This enhances their bargaining positions at the cost of the risk of no trade. New cheap talk
equilibria are characterized by both less trade and a reduction in the expected gains from
trade.
We analyze one-to-one matching market between workers and ￿rms in this paper. We
examine an environment when workers have almost aligned preferences. Each worker has
either "typical" commonly known preferences with probability close to one or "atypical"
preferences taken from some distribution with complementary probability close to zero. The
preferences of workers are ex-ante independently distributed. Firms have identical and com-
monly known preferences over workers. We consider a decentralized matching game with
three stages. First, each worker chooses some ￿rm, which she sends her signal to. Each
worker can send at most one signal7. Workers send signals simultaneously. Only ￿rms that
4See also Parendo (2007) for related work.
5Coles and Niederle (2007)￿ s analysis is limited by the assumption that each ￿rm can see only the signal
from its most preferred worker. Kushnir (2008) relaxes this assumption and extends their results to the case
of many-to-one matching market with many signals. He also shows explicitly that the introduction of signals
ambiguously a⁄ects the welfare of ￿rms.
6We are thankful for Lones Smith who drew our attention to this comparison.
7A worker can abstain from sending any signal.
2receive signals observe them. Second, ￿rms make decisions about job o⁄ers taking into ac-
count signals received at the ￿rst stage. Each ￿rm can make only one o⁄er. Finally, each
worker chooses some o⁄er to accept among available o⁄ers. Each worker can accept at most
one o⁄er.
We show that if ￿rms respond to signals in this environment, i.e. treat signals informa-
tively, the introduction of signals decreases the expected number of matches and the welfare
of ￿rms. The e⁄ect of signals on the welfare of workers is ambiguous. Intuitively, they help
workers with "atypical" preferences to obtain better matches, but at the same time, they de-
prive some workers with "typical" preferences of their matches. Overall, our analysis reveals
two important roles of signals. On the one hand, signals reduce coordination failures be-
cause they transmit previously unavailable information about workers￿preferences. On the
other hand, signals introduce information asymmetry. They transmit information about the
preferences of students to the limited number of ￿rms, leaving the other ￿rms uninformed.
This information asymmetry facilitates coordination failures.
Let us illustrate why signals can facilitate coordination failures by a simple example with
three ￿rms and three workers. The ￿rms rank the workers in the same order (w1;w2;w3),
i.e. they strictly prefer worker w1 to worker w2 to worker w3. Each worker￿ s preference is
either "typical" (f1;f2;f3) with probability 1￿"; " << 1 or "atypical" with complementary
probability "8. "Atypical" preferences are uniformly distributed among all possible preference
order lists. All workers are acceptable to all ￿rms and vice versa.
If signals are not allowed, the only possible match in an equilibrium is the assortative
match, in which each ￿rm is matched to the corresponding worker. If signals are allowed,
we consider the following equilibrium strategies of agents. Each worker with "typical" pref-
erences sends her signal to the corresponding ￿rm (worker wi sends her signal to ￿rm fi).
Each worker with "atypical" preferences send her signal to the best ￿rm worse or equal to
the corresponding one (according to ￿ typical￿preferences). Each ￿rm makes her o⁄er to a
worker better or equal to the corresponding one only if it receives a signal from her. Each
￿rm ignores all signals from workers worse than the corresponding one. If a ￿rm receives no
signals, it makes an o⁄er to the best worker worse than the corresponding one.
8See section 2 for the exact assumption on ".
3Figure I.
Let us consider the realization of preference pro￿les when only worker w1 is "atypical"
and ￿rm f3 is her favorite ￿rm. Worker w2 and worker w3 are "typical". Then, worker
w1 sends her signal to ￿rm f3. Worker w2 and worker w3 send their signals to ￿rm f2 and
￿rm f3 correspondingly. Firm f3 makes her o⁄er to worker w1, and ￿rm f1 anticipates that
worker w1 is "atypical" and makes her o⁄er to worker w2. However, the coordination failure
arises because ￿rm f2 has no information about worker w1￿ s type and cannot anticipate
￿rm f1￿ s behavior. Firm f2 makes also her o⁄er to worker w2, and it eventually ends up
unmatched because worker w2 accepts ￿rm f1￿ s o⁄er. Thus, the number of matches for
some realization of preferences is fewer than the number of matches when the signals are not
allowed. Therefore, the expected number of matches is also fewer.
A substantial part of the literature on two-sided matching markets studies centralized
markets that employ deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962).
The outcome of this algorithm is a "stable" matching, in which no agents is matched to an
unacceptable agent of the other side of the market, and no pair of agents is unmatched if it
prefers to be matched. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance
algorithm can deliver thickness to the market, help deal with the congestion, and make it safe
to participate (Roth (2008b)). These desirable properties have allowed some failed markets
to be successfully reorganized. Roth (2008a) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) present an
excellent overview of the main theoretical accomplishments in this area.
However, many labor markets are decentralized or at least preceded by decentralized
opportunities for participants to match. Therefore, the analysis of decentralized matching
markets outcomes and devices that facilitate match formation for these markets appear to
be an important issue. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) propose a simple mechanism in
4form of a two-stage game that implements stable matches9. Pais (2006) models decentral-
ized matching markets by means of a sequential game where ￿rms are randomly given the
opportunity to make job o⁄ers. She shows that every stable matching can be reached as
the outcome of an equilibrium play of the game. Niederle and Yariv (2008) is one of the
few papers that study decentralized matching markets under incomplete information. They
show that strong assumptions are required for the existence of equilibrium strategies that
yield a stable outcome in the presence of uncertainty and frictions.
Finally, we want to note that this paper does not analyze search for matches. Agents
usually need to perform costly search to locate a better partner in decentralized matching
markets. Contrary to search literature (see Chade and Smith (2006), Lee and Schwarz (2007),
Kircher (2008)), we assume that agents perfectly know the payo⁄s from their matches.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our general model. Our main result that
costless signaling is actually harmful for some matching markets is presented in section 3.
Section 4 derives two roles that signals play in matching markets: transmit information and
facilitate asymmetry. Finally, section 5 concludes and outlines some directions for further
research.
2 Model.
We consider a two-sided matching market with N workers and M ￿rms, N ￿ M. The set of
workers and the set of ￿rms are denoted as W and F correspondingly. W and F include the
empty set f?g. Each worker w has a strict preference order ￿w over ￿rms. Similarly, each
￿rm f has a strict preference order ￿f over workers. ￿W and ￿F are the set of all possible
workers￿and ￿rms￿preference orders. Each agent knows only her/its preference order list
and has some ex-ante common believes about the other agents￿preferences. We assume that
agents￿preferences are independently distributed and denote the joint distribution of agents￿
types as g(￿), where ￿ 2 (￿W)
N ￿ (￿F)
M :
Though we mainly analyze ordinal utilities of agents, we employ the equilibrium concept
9See also Alcalde (1996), Alcalde et al. (1998), and Haeringer and Wooders (2008).
5which demands the speci￿cation of cardinal utilities. As well, we need cardinal utilities in
order to analyze welfare properties of equilibria. Each agent a has cardinal utility compatible
with her/its preference ranking ￿a
10. If worker w with ranking ￿w is matched with ￿rm f,
she receives utility uw(f;￿w). Similarly, if ￿rm f with ranking ￿f is matched with worker w,
it receives utility uf(w;￿f).
To make our exposition more comprehensible we assume that cardinal utility from being
matched with an agent on the kth position in one￿ s ranking is the same across agents. We
denote this cardinal utility as ￿k. Additionally, agent￿ s cardinal utility from being unmatched
is normalized to zero. We also assume that there is no worker which ￿rms do not want to
hire, and there is no worker who prefers being unemployed to being matched with some ￿rm,
i.e. for any k; ￿k > 0.
Our main goal is to model the in￿ uence of signals on the congested markets. In order to
accomplish it, we consider one period model of workers and ￿rms. Each worker can send at
most one signal and accept at most one o⁄er. Then, each ￿rm has only one vacant position
and can make at most one o⁄er11. The timing of the game is the following.
1. Agents￿preferences are realized. Workers send signals to ￿rms simultaneously. Only
￿rms who receive signals observe them.
2. Firms make o⁄ers to workers simultaneously. Using knowledge of the received signals
each ￿rm makes its o⁄er to some worker. A ￿rm can make an o⁄er to any worker
independently on whether it receives a signal from this worker or not.
3. Workers choose o⁄ers to accept.
We restrict our analysis to pure strategies12. A strategy of worker w is a duple vw =
(v1
w;v2
w) that represents her decisions on the ￿rst and third stages. A strategy of a worker
on the ￿rst stage is to choose a ￿rm she sends her signal to, v1
w : ￿W ! F. A strategy of
10We employ cardinal utilities compatible with ordinal ranking similar to Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
11In practice, some ￿rms should rationally make several o⁄ers, anticipating that some workers probably
reject their o⁄ers. We do not model this ￿rms￿decision.
12Mixed strategy does not add much to our analysis, though they make comprehension of our results more
involved.
6a worker on the last stage is to choose an o⁄er among available to her, v2
w : ￿W ￿ 2F ! F;
where 2F = fh : h ￿ Fg.
A strategy of ￿rm f is its decision on the second stage. Based on its preferences and a
set of received signals ￿rm f chooses which worker it makes an o⁄er to, vf : ￿F ￿2W ! W,
where 2W = fh : h ￿ Wg:
For a given strategy pro￿le of agents v = (vw;vf) and realized agents￿types ￿ 2 (￿W)
N ￿
(￿F)
M one can determine the ￿nal matching and agents￿utilities. We denote the utility of
agent a given a strategy pro￿le v and a pro￿le of types ￿ as ua(v;￿): In the same manner,
the interim expected payo⁄of worker w with preferences ￿w from strategy vw when the other





where g(￿￿w) is the joint distribution of all agents except worker w. A ￿rm f interim
expected payo⁄given its preferences ￿f; a subset of received signals h ￿ W, believes ￿f(￿jh);





We employ the concept of perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for multi-stage games with ob-
served actions and incomplete information in order to solve the game(see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991)).
De￿nition 1. A strategy pro￿le (v￿
w;v￿
f) and posterior beliefs ￿f(￿jh) for each ￿rm f
and each subset of workers h ￿ W is a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if:








8w 2 W; ￿w 2 ￿W; h0 ￿ F : v2
w(h0;￿w) 2 argmax
￿2h0uw(￿;￿w)
Also, for any f 2 F and h ￿ W; ￿f(￿jh) =
Q
wi
￿f(￿wijh); and believes are de￿ned using
7Bayesian rule whenever possible.
We present our main results in the next section. We consider a speci￿cation of the above
model in which the preferences of agents are almost aligned and show that the signals have
a negative in￿ uence on matching formation in this case.
3 Almost aligned preferences.
This section analyzes the case when agents￿preferences are almost aligned. First, we describe
the type of agents￿preferences we analyze and introduce some de￿nitions. Then, we analyze
the benchmark model when signals are not allowed. Afterwards, we proceed with the analysis
of the model with signals. In this case, there are two types of pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibria: babbling and informative. All ￿rms ignore signals in the former one, which leads
to the same matching as in the case when signals are not allowed. However, if some ￿rms
respond to signals, which happens in an informative equilibrium, the introduction of signals
changes the matching formation. In the end of the section, we discuss the roles of signals in
match formation and their implication on the welfare of market participants.
We consider an environment when each worker can be of two types: "typical" or "atypi-
cal". A "typical" worker is denoted as w(T) and she has a ￿xed preference list ￿0; the same
for all typical workers. We enumerate ￿rms according preference ￿0; i.e. f1 is the best ￿rm,
f2 is the second best, etc. An "atypical" worker is denoted as w(A) and she has a preference
list ￿
A
w, which is ex-ante distributed according to some distribution A(￿W). Each worker is





￿0 if ￿w = 0
￿
A
w if ￿w = 1
where ￿w; w 2 W; are independent and identically distributed across workers. Also, ￿s 2
f0;1g and P(￿s = 1) = ". We assume that " is small.





8We also assume that the distribution of "atypical" preferences, A(￿); has a full support,
i.e. each ￿rm can be the top ￿rm of an "atypical" worker with some positive probability.
Assumption A. A(￿) has a full support: for any f 2 F and any w 2 W Pr(f = max￿wff0 :
f0 2 Fg) > 0.
We consider a model, where ￿rms have the same ￿xed preferences list ￿f
13. Similar
to ￿rms, we also enumerate workers according to this preference list. To avoid unneces-
sary notation, we omit, henceforth, the dependence of ￿rms￿strategies on their preferences,
vf(h;￿f) ￿ vf(h).
Even the signals are voluntary in our model, they still can play negative role and draw
away the o⁄ers of ￿rms. In order to eliminate such equilibria, we assume that if ￿rm f makes
an o⁄er to worker w when it does not receive her signal, ￿rm f makes an o⁄er to worker w
when it receives her signal14.
Assumption PRS (Positive Role of Signals). For any ￿rm f 2 F and any worker w 2
W and any h ￿ W; w = 2 h, if vf(h) = w then vf(h [ w) = w.
Now we introduce a couple of new notations that are helpful in our further discussion.
We call a subset of workers h ￿ W as reached for ￿rm f when agents follow strategy pro￿le
v if ex-ante probability that only workers from set h send their signals to ￿rm f strictly more
than zero.
De￿nition 2. A subset of workers h ￿ W is reached for ￿rm f when agents follow












1 if vw(￿w) = f
0 otherwise
.
13We believe that our results are still valid for the model in which the preferences of ￿rms are almost
aligned.
14See example A1in Appendix for an example of an equilibrium when assumption PRS is violated in
Appendix.
9We call ￿rm f responds to worker w￿ s signal if her signal changes the strategy of ￿rm f
with positive probability.
De￿nition 3. Firm f responds to worker w￿ s signal if there exists a subset of workers
h; w = 2 h, such that both h and h [ w are reached for ￿rm f, and vf(h) 6= vf(h [ w).
Let us consider an environment when workers cannot send signals. Then, the outlined
above model is a static game of incomplete information. Therefore, a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium coincides with a Bayesian equilibrium and agents￿believes are irrelevant.
If signals are not allowed and " is small, the dominant strategy of ￿rm f1 is to make
an o⁄er to worker w1. The second top ￿rm anticipates that worker w1 is likely to accept
￿rm f1￿ s o⁄er. Hence, the dominant strategy of ￿rm f2 is to make an o⁄er to worker w2.
Sequentially, the dominant strategy of each ￿rm is to make an o⁄er to the corresponding
worker.
Proposition 1 (No signaling equilibrium) If assumption E holds and signals are not
allowed then the only equilibrium match is the assortative match.
Now, we analyze the set of equilibria in the matching market with signals. We distinguish
two kinds of equilibria.
De￿nition 4.
- An equilibrium is babbling if no ￿rm responds to any signal.
- An equilibrium is informative if there is at least one ￿rm that responds to some worker￿ s
signal.
We proceed with the characterization of equilibria in the following two subsections.
103.1 Babbling equilibria
This section analyzes equilibria when ￿rms do not respond to signals. We ￿rst show a result,
which we will further frequently refer to. It states that each ￿rm believes that each worker
has "typical" preferences with probability more than 1￿" either when it receives her signal
or it does not receive her signal.
Proposition 2 For any worker w 2 W, any ￿rm f 2 F, and any set of workers h ￿ W
either ￿f(￿w = ￿0jh [ w) ￿ 1 ￿ " or ￿f(￿w = ￿0jhnw) ￿ 1 ￿ ". Similarly, either ￿f(￿w 6=
￿0jh [ w) ￿ " or ￿f(￿w 6= ￿0jhnw) ￿ ".
Proof.
Let us denote the probability that worker w(A) and worker w(T) send their signals
to ￿rm f as ￿A and ￿T correspondingly. Then, if worker w sends her signal to ￿rm f;




￿f(￿w = ￿0jh [ w) =
(1￿")￿T
(1￿")￿T+"￿A
￿f(￿w = ￿0jhnw) =
(1￿")(1￿￿T)
(1￿")(1￿￿T)+"(1￿￿A)




￿f(￿w = ￿0jh [ w) ￿ 1 ￿ " , ￿T ￿ ￿A
￿f(￿w = ￿0jhnw) ￿ 1 ￿ " , ￿T ￿ ￿A
Hence, either ￿f(￿w = ￿0jh [ w) ￿ 1 ￿ " or ￿f(￿w = ￿0jhnw) ￿ 1 ￿ ".
If worker w never sends her signal to ￿rm f, (1 ￿ ")￿T + "￿A = 0; ￿rm f￿ s believes are
￿f(￿w = ￿0jhnw) = 1 ￿ " and ￿f(￿w = ￿0jh [ w) is arbitrary. The second statement follows
from the ￿rst one. ￿
Now we are ready to characterize the set of possible matches in a babbling equilibrium.
If " is small (assumption E) and ￿rms do not response to signals, signals play no role in
equilibria. Hence, the only possible match in a babbling equilibrium is the assortative match
as in our benchmark case.
11Theorem 1 The only possible match in a babbling equilibrium is the assortative match.
Proof.
Assume that no ￿rm responds to any signal. Let us assume that there exists a realization
of agents￿preferences such that ￿rm f1 is matched to some worker wi, i > 1; in an equilibrium.
Hence, there exists h ￿ W, reached in the equilibrium, such that vf1(h) = wi. If w1 2 h
￿rm f1￿ s belief equals ￿f1(￿w1 = ￿0jh) < 1 ￿ ", otherwise ￿rm f1 should make her o⁄er to
worker w1. Hence, ￿f1(￿w1 = ￿0jhnw1) > 1 ￿ " (see proposition 2) and worker w1 secures
￿rm f1￿ s o⁄er in the equilibrium if she does not send her signal to it and ￿rm f1 receives
signals only from set hnw1 of workers, vf1(hnw1) = w1. Firm f1 never responds to signals.
Therefore, this is possible only if hnw1 is not reached for ￿rm f1 in the equilibrium. However,
the strategies of workers are not correlated. Hence, if set h is reached and set hnw1 is not
reached for ￿rm f1, worker w1 always sends her signal to ￿rm f1: However, this means
that ￿f1(￿w1 = ￿0jh) = 1 ￿ ". Hence, ￿rm f1￿ s strategy is suboptimal. Firm f1￿ s payo⁄
is maximized if it makes its o⁄er to worker w1. One may similarly show a contradiction if
w1 = 2 h.
The other possibility that ￿rm f1 is not matched to worker w1 in an equilibrium is that
￿rm f1 is unmatched. Let us assume that this is the case for some pro￿le of preferences in
an equilibrium. Hence, worker w1 prefers some ￿rm fk; k > 1; to ￿rm f1 for this pro￿le of
preferences, i.e. she is "atypical". Therefore, there exists h0 ￿ W, reached for ￿rm fk in the
equilibrium, such that vfk(h0) = w1. If set h0nw1 is not reached for ￿rm fk in the equilibrium,
its belief about worker w1 is ￿fk(￿w1 6= ￿0jh0) = ", which contradicts the rationality of ￿rm
fk￿ s behavior15. Therefore, set h0nw1 is reached for ￿rm fk in the equilibrium. Firm fk should
make an o⁄er to worker w1, i.e. vfk(h) = vfk(hnw1) = w1; because ￿rm fk does nor respond
to signals. Hence, its beliefs according to proposition 2 are either ￿fk(￿w1 6= ￿0jh) ￿ " or
￿fk(￿w1 6= ￿0jhnw1) ￿ " . Assume the former one, ￿fk(￿w1 6= ￿0jh) ￿ "16. If ￿rm fk makes her
o⁄er to worker w1, vfk(hnw1) = w1, it should believe that ￿fk(￿wk = ￿0jh) < 1￿", otherwise
￿rm fk plays suboptimal strategy. Hence, ￿rm fk￿ s belief is ￿fk(￿wk = ￿0jh [ wk) ￿ 1 ￿ "
15The argument about unreachable sets is omitted further. If either h0 [ w1 or h0nw1 is not reached for
￿rm fk, either worker w always sends her signal to ￿rm fk or worker w1 never sends her signal to ￿rm fk
correspondingly. Hence, the below arguments follow trivially.
16If we assume the latter one, the argument is similar.
12(if h[wk is not reached for ￿rm fk in the equilibrium the argument is trivial) and ￿rm fk￿ s
strategies are vfk(h[wk) = vfk(h) = w1. However, this strategy cannot be optimal, because
￿rm fk￿ s payo⁄ from making an o⁄er to worker wk, when worker wk sends her signal to it,
equals at least (1￿")￿k. Taking into account assumption E, we obtain that (1￿")￿k > "￿1.
Contradiction.
We argued above that the best feasible worker for ￿rm f2 is worker w2. Hence, using
similar speculations one may show that ￿rm f2 can be matched only with worker w2 in a
babbling equilibrium. Therefore, the only feasible match in a babbling equilibrium is the
assortative match. It is a routine to show that the assortative match can be supported by
some system of beliefs in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. ￿
3.2 Informative equilibria
This subsection considers equilibria in which at least one ￿rm responds to some worker￿ s
signal. There is a great multiplicity of such equilibria. For example, each ￿rm can believe
that it is the worst program in worker￿ s preferences if it receives her signal. Taking into
account this belief this worker rationally never sends her signal to this ￿rm in equilibrium.
Therefore, these believes are o⁄-equilibrium path, and they are consistent with the notion
of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In order to make our analysis more focused we consider in this subsection the equilibria
when each ￿rm responds to signals from any worker better or equal to the corresponding
one.17. According to assumption A, each ￿rm is the best ￿rm for each worker with positive
probability. Hence, each worker prefers this ￿rm to all other ￿rms with positive probability.
Hence, if she could use her signal to receive its o⁄er, she would use her signal. In the same
time, each ￿rm would prefer the match with each worker better than the corresponding one.
The assumption that each ￿rm responds to signals from any worker better or equal to the
corresponding one guarantees that each ￿rm should make its o⁄er to such workers if it does
not receive a better signal18.
17This re￿nement makes the results more comprehensible. All the results are still true if there is enough
programs that responds to students￿signals.
18See proposition A2 in Appendix for more detailed explanation.
13We postpone the explanation of patterns of agents￿behavior in informative equilibria
to Appendix. It appears that a ￿rm never makes its o⁄er to a worker better than the
corresponding one if it does not receive a signal from her in an equilibrium. In addition, if
a ￿rm responds to some worker￿ s signal and her signal is the best signal it receives, the ￿rm
makes its o⁄er to this worker. We concentrate here only on the discussion of our main result
about existence and uniqueness of equilibria.
Let us denote the set of workers worse or equal to worker wj as ￿j = fw1;:::;wjg ￿ W.
Then, there is a unique equilibrium such that each ￿rm responds to all signals from workers
better or equal to the corresponding one.
Theorem 2 If each ￿rm responds to all signals from workers better or equal to the corre-
sponding one, the set of strategies





max￿fj(w : w 2 h) if h \ ￿j 6= 0
wj+1 if h \ ￿j = 0
and set of ￿rms￿beliefs consistent with agents￿strategies constitute a unique equilibrium.
Basically, each worker sends her signal to the best ￿rm (according to her preferences)
among the ￿rms worse or equal to the corresponding one (according to "typical" preference).
If ￿rm fj receives at least one signal from corresponding worker wj or better one, it makes
an o⁄er to the best such a worker, otherwise it makes an o⁄er to worker wj+1:
The above result completes our description of agents￿behavior in equilibria. If we do
not assume that each ￿rm responds to signals from any worker better or equal to the cor-
responding one, there is a great multiplicity of equilibria in our model. However, it is still
possible to derive the welfare comparison and evaluate the role of signals for all equilibria.
We proceed with this analysis in the next subsection.
143.3 Welfare properties of equilibria
We evaluate the e⁄ect of signals from ex-ante perspective. We mainly use the following
quantitative characteristics: the expected number of matches, the expected total welfare of
￿rms and the expected total welfare of workers. However, theorem 4 provides also some
results for the e⁄ect of signals on the individual ￿rms.
Let us denote the ex-post number of matches when agents follow pro￿le of strategies v;
and the realized pro￿le of preferences is ￿ 2 ￿W ￿ ￿F as m(v;￿). The expected number of
















Proposition 1 shows that the expected number of matches in any ￿ no signaling￿equilib-
rium equals M (under assumption that N ￿ M), which is the maximum one. Hence, it is
impossible that the expected number of matches in any informative equilibrium exceeds the
expected number of matches in any "no signaling" equilibrium. Example 1 and example 2
demonstrate the case of equality and strict inequality for this welfare criterion.
The preferences of ￿rms are the same. Firms are also matched to the best workers in any
￿ no signaling￿equilibrium. Hence, the decrease in the expected number of matches leads to
the decrease of the expected total welfare of ￿rms.
The result about total workers￿welfare is not such straightforward and depends on their
cardinal utility. The intuition is that signals help "atypical" workers. In the same time,
they decrease the expected number of matches, which makes worse some workers. Example
3 illustrates this point.
15Example 1 (Equal expected number of matches)
Let us consider the following equilibrium strategies.
- for any l < M; vwl(￿wl) = max￿wl(f : f 2 ffl;fl+1g)
- for any l ￿ M vwM(￿0) = fM




max￿f(w : w 2 h) if h \ ￿l 6= 0
wl+1 if h \ ￿l = 0
If for any h ￿ W and for any 1 ￿ l ￿ M; 1 ￿ k ￿ N; k 6= l;l ￿ 1, we denote ￿fl =
f￿ 2 ￿ : fl = min￿(f : f 2 F)g. Then, ￿rm f0
ls o⁄-equilibrium path beliefs are such that for
any h ￿ W ￿fl(￿wk 2 ￿fljh[wk) = 1. As one may check, the described strategies constitute
an equilibrium. Moreover, the introduction of signals does not lead to the loss of the number
of matches. If worker wl is "atypical" and prefers ￿rm fl+1 to ￿rm fl, she sends her signal to
￿rm fl+1. Firm fl+1 makes her o⁄er to worker wl. In the same time, ￿rm fl makes her o⁄er
to worker wl+1. There is no loss in the number of matches, because ￿rm fl and ￿rm fl+1
exchange their matches. The total welfare of ￿rms neither changes. The expected welfare
of workers increases, because they end up with better matches than in any ￿ no signaling￿
equilibrium.
Example 2 (Fewer expected number of matches)
The fact that the expected number of matches decreases is illustrated perfectly by the
example in the introduction. One may extend this example to the case with more workers
and ￿rms. We present only ￿gure II to illustrate the idea. The explanation is similar to the
one in the introduction.
Figure II.
16Example 3 (Welfare of workers)
Let us consider three ￿rms and three workers and the uniform distribution of "atypical"
preferences A(￿) = U(￿). Workers￿cardinal utilities: (￿1;￿2;￿3) = (￿ + ￿;￿;￿ ￿ ￿). The













Let us consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, described in theorem 2. One may check
that the expected total welfare of workers equals19
EW
signals







Hence, the expected total welfare of workers increases if and only if the di⁄erence in utilities
between adjacent ￿rms is large enough, ￿ > 2
19￿. This illustrates that the introduction of
signals is bene￿cial for a matching market according to egalitarian welfare criterion if and
only if the decrease in the total number of matches is o⁄set by better matches of "atypical"
workers.
The below theorem summarize the results derived above.
Theorem 3 - The expected number of matches in any informative equilibrium is weakly
fewer than in any ￿ no signaling￿equilibrium.
- The expected total welfare of ￿rms in any informative equilibrium is weakly less than
in ￿ no signaling￿equilibrium.
- The e⁄ect of signals on the expected total welfare of workers is ambiguous.
We have compared an informative and ￿ no signaling￿equilibrium using aggregate welfare
criteria. The following theorem provides more strict results for individual ￿rms.
19The terms "2 and "3 are ignored.
17Theorem 4 If ￿rm fl￿1 and at least one ￿rm among ffl+1;:::;fMg responds to worker wl￿1￿ s
signal in an informative equilibrium, then
- ￿rm fl￿ s expected number of matches is strictly fewer in any ￿ informative￿equilibrium
than in any ￿ no signaling￿equilibrium.
Moreover, if no worker among fs1;:::;sl￿1g sends her signal to ￿rm fl in any ￿ infor-
mative￿equilibrium, then
- ￿rm fl￿ s expected welfare is strictly less in an ￿ informative￿equilibrium than in any
￿ no signaling￿equilibrium.
4 Role of signals in matching markets
The previous study by Coles and Niederle (2007) shows that the introduction of signals
facilitates match formation. They consider a model similar to the model of this paper except
that agents preferences are uniformly distributed, ￿s ￿ U(￿s) and ￿p ￿ U(￿p). They show
that the introduction of signals increase the expected number of matches and the welfare
of workers20. As shown in the previous section, these results, however, highly rely on the
assumption that the preferences of agents are uniformly distributed.
If the preferences of workers are almost aligned and the preferences of ￿rms are the same,
the introduction of signals decreases the expected number of matches and the expected
total welfare of ￿rms. The in￿ uence of signals on the welfare of workers is ambiguous.
Overall, table I presents the e⁄ects from the introduction of the signals for the two di⁄erent
environments: almost aligned and uniform distribution of preferences.
20Kushnir (2008) relaxes one of their assumptions and extends their results to the case of many-to-one
matching market with many signals. He also shows explicitly that the introduction of signals ambiguously
a⁄ects the welfare of ￿rms.
18Preferences No signals EMatches EWworker EW￿rm
Almost aligned 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
Uniform distribution 0 + + ￿
Table I. Almost aligned VS uniform distribution preferences
A natural question is why signals in￿ uence matching markets in di⁄erent ways. We argue
that the signals play two di⁄erent roles: transmit information and facilitate information
asymmetry. On the one hand, the introduction of signals helps "atypical" workers to transmit
the information about their preferences and locate a better match. On the other hand, signals
transmit information to small number of ￿rms, which facilitate information asymmetry. This
information asymmetry leads to coordination failures, which decrease the number of matches
in the market.
Preferences Transmit information Facilitate information asymmetry
Almost aligned Small Large
Uniform distribution Large Small
Table II. The roles of signals
When there is ex-ante small amount of information about agents￿preferences, the in-
formation transmission plays more important role in match formation. This happens when
agents￿preferences are ex-ante uniformly distributed as in Coles and Niederle (2007). How-
ever, when there is almost complete information about agents￿preferences (as in this paper),
the introduction of signals leads to coordination failures. Overall, the signals play the con-
troversial roles in match formation process. This makes them a less powerful tool than it
was previously anticipated.
5 Conclusion
We exemplify an environment when the introduction of signals harms matching markets:
lessens the expected number of matches, decreases the welfare of ￿rms, and a⁄ects am-
19biguously the welfare of workers. Based on this example, we argue that the signals play
controversial roles in match formation. Though they help to transmit information about
participants￿preferences, they also facilitate the information asymmetry among them. While
the former one reduces coordination failures and facilitates better match formation, the lat-
ter one acts in the opposite direction. We leave here, as an open empirical question, what
e⁄ect dominates in real matching markets.
We consider a one-period model where each worker sends at most one signal and each
￿rm has only one vacant position. However, these assumptions are not crucial for our results.
Several (￿nite) periods would allow ￿rms to secure a better match, but signals would still
introduce information asymmetry. If each worker sent several signals, it would transmit
information to greater number of ￿rms, but each signal would be less informative. Several
vacant positions would make only the preferences of ￿rms more complicated and would
not in￿ uence the results. Overall, the roles of signals in match formation robust to these
modi￿cations.
One interesting question for further theoretical research is to analyze the e⁄ect of signals
for a larger range of preference distributions. Though an analytical analysis can be a cum-
bersome for other cases, a computer simulation seems a perfectly suitable tool to accomplish
this goal.
Another interesting question is to explore the e⁄ect of public signals. Do the signals
bene￿t matching markets if all ￿rms can observe them? One potential problem with public
signals is that they may induce some complicated strategic behavior by agents, which may
render them useless.
20A Appendix
The ￿rst two propositions are devoted to the description of agents￿strategies in informative
equilibria. The ￿rst proposition shows that it is too risky for a ￿rm to make an o⁄er to a
worker better than the corresponding one if it does not receive a signal from her.
Proposition A1 (O⁄ers to better workers) If ￿rm fj does not receive a signal from
worker wi, i < j, it does not make an o⁄er to her in an equilibrium.
Proof.
We proof this proposition by induction. Let us show the validity of the claim for
j = 2. We consider two possibilities: either worker w1(T) does not send a signal to ￿rm f1,
vw1(￿0) 6= f1; or she sends a signal to ￿rm f1, vw1(￿0) = f1:
Worker w1 employs strategy vw1(￿0) 6= f1 in an equilibrium only if ￿rm f1 makes its
o⁄er to worker w1 with probability equals to one. Firm f2 has a chance to be matched with
worker w1 only if she is ￿ atypical￿ . Similar to proposition 2, we denote the probability that
worker w1(A) and worker w1(T) send a signal to ￿rm f2 as ￿A and ￿T correspondingly.
Let us assume that worker w1(T) sends her signal to ￿rm f2 in an equilibrium, i.e. ￿T = 1.
If ￿rm f2 does not receive a signal from worker w1, it believes that worker w1 is ￿ atypical￿ .
According to assumption PRS, if ￿rm f2 makes an o⁄er to worker w1 when it does not
receive her signal, it should make an o⁄er to her when it receives her signal. However, ￿rm
f2￿ s believes are such in this case that for any h ￿ W
￿f2(￿w1 6= ￿0jh [ w1) =
￿A"
￿A"+￿T(1￿") ￿ "
Now, if worker w1(T) does not send her signal to ￿rm f2, (￿T = 0); ￿rm f2￿ s belief is such
that for any h ￿ W
￿f2(￿w1 6= ￿0jhnw1) =
(1￿￿A)"
(1￿￿A)"+(1￿￿T)(1￿") ￿ "
For both cases, ￿T = 1 and ￿T = 0, ￿rm f2￿ s payo⁄ from making her o⁄er to worker w1
is less than "￿1. According to assumption M ￿ N; ￿rm f2 can secure a match with some
21worker wt; t > 2; with probability at least 1 ￿ ". Hence, ￿rm f2 does not make an o⁄er to
worker w1 in an equilibrium.
If worker w1 employs strategy vw1(￿0) = f1, similar to the above discussion ￿rm f2￿ s
belief is ￿f2(￿w1 6= ￿0jhnw1) ￿ ". Hence, it is again suboptimal for ￿rm f2 to make an o⁄er
to worker w1.
We have shown that it is not optimal for ￿rm f2 to make an o⁄er to a better student
if it does not send her signal to it. Let us assume that the claim is valid for any fj; j < k
and show that the claim is valid for ￿rm fk: Let us consider some worker wi, i < k. Firm
fi makes her o⁄er to workers better than worker wi with probability less than "(i ￿ 1): In
addition, worker wi is "atypical" with probability ". Hence, ￿rm fk can secure a match with
worker wi with probability less than i": Assumption E guarantees that " is small enough
that ￿rm fk￿ s o⁄er to worker wi is suboptimal. ￿
Now we assume that each ￿rm responds to a signal from any worker better or equal to
the corresponding one. The following proposition shows that a ￿rm makes its o⁄er to some
worker better or equal to the corresponding one if the worker￿ s signal is the best signal the
￿rm receives.
Proposition A2 (Response to signals) Assume that M > N; and each ￿rm responds to
a signal from any worker better or equal to the corresponding one. Then, for any ￿rm fj;
worker wi, i￿ j, and any h ￿ W vfj(h [ win￿i￿1) = wi in an equilibrium21:
Proof.
We proof this statement by induction. Let us consider ￿rst ￿rm f1 and worker w1. If
worker w1 employs strategy vw1(￿0) 6= f1, for any h ￿ W ￿rm f1￿ s belief is ￿f1(￿w1 =
￿0jhnw1) ￿ 1 ￿ ". Hence, ￿rm f1 always makes an o⁄er to worker w1, which contradicts to
our assumption that it responds to worker w1￿ s signal. Therefore, the only possible optimal
strategy of worker w1 is vw1(￿0) = f1. In this case, for any h ￿ W ￿rm f1￿ s belief is
￿f1(￿w1 = ￿0jh [ w1) ￿ 1 ￿ ". Hence, ￿rm f1￿ s the highest expected payo⁄ when it receives
21If M = N the claim is still valid with the same assumption for all ￿rms except ￿rm fM. Firm fM should
respond to a signal from any worker strictly better than the corresponding one.
22worker w1￿ s signal is from making an o⁄er to worker w1. Hence, for any h ￿ W; ￿rm f1￿ s
strategy vf1(h [ win￿i￿1) = w1 is optimal.
Assume now that for any t ￿ j < k, and for any h ￿ W, ￿rm fj employs strategy
vfj(h[wtn￿t￿1) = wt: We prove below that ￿rm fk￿ s optimal strategy is for any h ￿ W and
any i ￿ k, vfk(h [ win￿i￿1) = wi:
Let us consider some i ￿ k. There are two possibilities: either vwk(￿0) 6= fk or vwk(￿0) =
fk: For the former case, for any h ￿ W; ￿fk(￿wk = ￿0jhnwk) ￿ 1 ￿ ": Hence, it is optimal
for ￿rm fk to make an o⁄er to worker wk when it receives no signals from workers from ￿k;
i.e. for any h0 ￿ W vfk(hnwkn￿k￿1) = wk. Hence, it is also optimal for ￿rm fk to make an
o⁄er to when worker wk￿ s signal is the best signal it receives, i.e. vfk(h [ wkn￿k￿1) = wk:
In addition, if ￿rm fk receives a signal from some worker, which belongs to set ￿k, it makes
an o⁄er to it independently on worker wk￿ s signal according to the induction assumption.
Therefore, ￿rm fk does not respond to signal from wk. Contradiction.
For the latter case, vwk(￿0) = fk, if ￿rm fk does not receive a signal from worker wk, it
anticipates that she is "atypical", and it does not make an o⁄er to her in an equilibrium.
If ￿rm fj receives signals from the set h [ win￿i￿1 (for some h ￿ W); no other ￿rm fp;
p 6= j and p > i; makes its o⁄er to worker wi according to proposition: The only competing
with ￿rm fj￿ s o⁄er could be the o⁄ers from ￿rms in set {fp; p < ig: However, any ￿rm fp,
p < i; could make an o⁄er to worker wi only if worker wp is "atypical", which happens with
probability ". Hence, the interim expected payo⁄for ￿rm fj from making its o⁄er to worker
wi equals at least (1￿(i￿1)")￿k which the highest interim payo⁄it could receive: Therefore,
￿rm fj makes its o⁄er to worker wi; vfj(h [ win￿i￿1) = wi. ￿
Proof of theorem 2.
We ￿rst prove that the set of strategies, stated in the theorem, constitute an equilibrium.
Then, we show that given assumption E, assumption A, and the assumption that all ￿rms
respond to a signal from any worker better or equal to the corresponding one, the equilibrium
is unique.
Let us show that, if all agents, except ￿rm fl; follow the strategies, stated in the theorem,
￿rm fl￿ s strategy is optimal given its believes consistent with the other agents￿strategies.
23If ￿rm fl receives a signal from worker wt; t < l; ￿rm fl believes that itself is the best ￿rm
among set ff0 2 F : f0 ￿￿0 ftg for worker wt. Let us assume that worker wt is the best
worker that sends a signal to ￿rm fl. Worker wt does not accepts ￿rm fl￿ s o⁄er only if she
receives an o⁄er form ￿rm ft￿1. However, it happens only if worker wt￿1 is atypical, i.e.
with probability less than ". Hence, ￿rm fl interim expected payo⁄ from making an o⁄er to
worker wt equals at least (1 ￿ ")￿t.
Firm fl￿ s expected payo⁄ from making an o⁄er to a worker better than worker wt is less
than (1 ￿ ")￿t according to proposition A1 and assumption E. Firm fl￿ s expected payo⁄
from making an o⁄er to worker wk, k > t; is less than making an o⁄er to worker wt, because
(1 ￿ ")￿t > ￿k: Overall, ￿rm fl￿ s strategy is optimal.
Let us show that, if all agents, except worker wt; follow the strategies, stated in the
theorem, worker wt￿ s strategy is optimal. Firm ft does not make an o⁄er to worker wt when
it receives a signal from a better worker. Therefore, if worker wt is "typical", her payo⁄
from sending a signal to ￿rm ft equals at least [1 ￿ (l ￿ 1)"]￿t. If worker wt does not send
her signal to ￿rm ft it loses her o⁄er. Her payo⁄ from sending a signal to a ￿rm worse than
￿rm ft is less or equal to ￿t￿1, which is less than [1 ￿ (l ￿ 1)"]￿t according to assumption E.
There is also no reason for worker wt to send a signal to a ￿rm better than ￿rm ft; because
this ￿rm does not respond to it. Hence, worker wt(T)0s strategy is optimal. Using similar
logic one may show that worker wt(A)￿ s strategy is also optimal.
Now we show that the above strategies constitute the unique equilibrium. Under assump-
tion that all ￿rms respond to signals from workers better or equal to the corresponding one,
proposition A1 and proposition A2 imply that each ￿rm fl, l = 1;:::;M has to follow the
following strategies in equilibrium: for any h ￿ W; vfl(hn￿l) 6= wl and vfl(h[wln￿l￿1) = wl:
Straightforwardly, the only worker wl(T)￿ s optimal strategy is to send her signals to ￿rm fl,
vwl(￿0) = sl, otherwise, ￿rm fl￿ s does not make an o⁄er to student wl:
Let us consider ￿rm f￿ = max￿wl(f0 2 F : f0 ￿￿0 fl). It responds to signals from workers
better or equal than the corresponding one and ￿rm f￿￿ s belief about worker wl￿ s type is
￿f￿(￿wl = ￿0jhnwl) ￿ 1 ￿ " and ￿f￿(￿wl 6= ￿0jh [ wl) = 1
24Therefore, if ￿rm f￿ does not receive a signal better than worker wl￿ s one, it￿ s optimal
strategy is to make an o⁄er to worker wl. Taking into account that ￿rm f￿ can receive
a signal from a better worker with probability less than (l ￿ 1)", worker wl(A)￿ s optimal
strategy is to send her signals to ￿rm f￿ (assumption E): Hence, the strategies, stated in the
theorem, constitute a unique equilibrium. ￿
Proof of theorem 4.
Assume that some ￿rm fj, j ￿ l+1; responds to worker wl￿1￿ s signal. We prove the ￿rst
statement of the theorem in two steps. First, we show that ￿rm fl makes an o⁄er to worker
wl with positive probability in any equilibrium. Second, we show that ￿rm fl￿1 also makes
an o⁄er to worker wl with positive probability in any equilibrium. The o⁄er decisions of ￿rm
fl and ￿rm fl￿1 appear to be uncorrelated and independent on worker wl type. Therefore,
￿rm fl is unmatched with positive probability.
We show that ￿rm fl makes an o⁄er to worker wl with positive probability in any equi-
librium by induction. Let us consider l = 1. There are two possibilities: vw1(￿0) = f1 or
vw1(￿0) 6= f1. For the former case, for any h ￿ W ￿f1(￿w1 = ￿0jh [ w1) ￿ 1 ￿ ". Hence, it is
optimal for ￿rm to make an o⁄er to worker w1 when it receives a signal from her. Worker
w1 is "typical" with positive probability, which means that ￿rm f1 makes an o⁄er to worker
w1 with positive probability. The latter case can happen in an equilibrium only when ￿rm
f1 always makes an o⁄er to worker w1 independently on whether it receives a signal from
her (assumption PRS).
Let us assume that for any i < l; ￿rm fi makes an o⁄er to worker wi with positive
probability in an equilibrium. Let us show that ￿rm fl also makes an o⁄er to worker wl
with positive probability. Firm fl responds to worker wi￿ s signal; i < l; only if vwi(￿0) 6= fl.
Hence, ￿rm fl makes an o⁄er to some worker in set ￿l￿1 with probability less than one (see
also proposition A1).
Assume worker wl employs strategy vwl(￿0) = fl: Hence, if ￿rm fl does not receive a
signal from a worker better than the corresponding one (or it does not responds to signals
it receives) and ￿rm fl receives a signal from worker wl, then ￿rm fl should rationally make
an o⁄er to worker wl.
25Assume worker wl employs strategy vwl(￿0) 6= fl. Firm fl makes an o⁄er to worker wi,
i < l; in an equilibrium with probability equal at most ": Therefore, ￿rm fl is not available
to worker wl with probability at most (l ￿ 1)". Assumption E guarantees that worker wl
employs strategy vwl(￿0) 6= fl in an equilibrium only if ￿rm fl follows the following strategy:
for any h ￿ W vfl(h [ wln￿l￿1) = wl (or it employs this strategy if it receives some signals
from workers better than the corresponding one, which it does not respond). Hence, ￿rm fl
makes also an o⁄er to worker wl with positive probability in this case.
Similar to the above speculations ￿rm fl￿1 does not receive a signal from a worker
better than worker wl￿1 (or it does not responds to better signals it receives) with posi-
tive probability. The fact that ￿rm fl￿1 responds to worker wl￿1￿ s signal guarantees that
vfl￿1(hn￿l￿1) 6= wl￿1. Therefore, if worker wl￿1 sends to ￿rm fl￿1 a signal with positive
probability, then for any h ￿ W ￿rm fl￿1 employs strategy vfl￿1(h [ wln￿l) = wl in an
equilibrium. If worker wl never sends a signal to ￿rm fl￿1, for any h ￿ W ￿rm fl￿1 employs
strategy vfl￿1(h[wln￿l) = wl in an equilibrium. For both cases, ￿rm fl￿1 makes an o⁄er to
worker wl with positive probability in an equilibrium.
Both ￿rm fl￿1 and ￿rm fl make their o⁄ers to worker wl with positive probability. More-
over, ￿rm fl￿1 makes o⁄er only if it does not receive a signal from worker wl￿1: However,
if worker wl￿1 sends her signal to ￿rm fj, ￿rm fl has no information about worker wl￿1
type and cannot predict behavior of ￿rm fl￿1. Therefore, both ￿rms make their o⁄ers to
worker wl simultaneously with positive probability in an equilibrium, which makes ￿rm fl
sometimes unmatched.
The second statement follows directly from the ￿rst one if one considers how ￿rm fl can
bene￿t from the introduction of signals. It may bene￿t if it ends up matched with some
worker better than its corresponding one. However, this happens according to proposition
A1 only if such a worker sends her a signal. Otherwise, it has only disadvantage from the
introduction of signals (being unmatched or being match to a worse worker) as was shown
above. ￿
26Example A1 (An equilibrium when assumption PRS does not hold.)
Let us consider two ￿rms and two workers. Assume that each "typical￿ worker has
preferences ￿0 = (f1;f2) and each "atypical" worker has preferences ￿A = (f2;f1) with
probability equal to one. Firms prefer worker w1 to worker w2. Agents employ the following
strategies:
- vw1(￿0) = f2; vw1(￿A) = f1
- vw2(￿0) = f1; vw2(￿A) = f2




w1 if w1 = 2 h





w1 if w1 = 2 h
w2 if w1 2 h
Agents￿believes are:
- for any h ￿ W ￿fj(￿wi : fj = max￿wi(f 2 F)jhnwi) = 1 and ￿fj(￿wi : fj = min￿wi(f 2
F)jh [ wi) = 1
It is easy to show that the above strategies and the set of beliefs constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. One may extend this example for the environment with more ￿rms
and workers.
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